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THE NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC OF STUDENT DEBT
Jonathan D. Glater*
Abstract
The swirl of concerns about and criticisms of the cost of higher
education and the debt burdens taken on by students masks a deeper
confusion over the goals student aid should pursue and over reforms to
enable achievement of those goals. This Article explores how the rhetoric
used in public discussion of college cost and student borrowing can get in
the way of what would be a difficult but critically important debate over
goals. Higher education is a personal, private “investment” that must be
“worth it” to the student; student “aid,” flexible loan repayment plans,
even debt forgiveness, all aim to make the financing of this investment
easier but also may “unfairly favor” certain career choices over others.
The very words used in these descriptions have consequences for how
higher education is understood. They invoke assumptions about the values
higher-education policy should pursue and get in the way of seeing choices
implicitly already made, choices that should be explicitly analyzed and
debated. Reform efforts in this area will turn on politics—a field highly
susceptible to rhetoric—and ignoring the implications of choices of words
runs a grave risk of foreclosing possibilities.
Higher education in the United States is enshrined in national stories in the
collective mythology of the nation. Higher education is the magical experience that
results in1 a host of benefits to the individual—from wealth2 to health;3 and to the
wider community—from tax revenue4 to public safety.5 In current discussions of the
benefits of college, higher incomes earned by graduates dominate the discourse and
are typically contrasted with falling earnings for those whose education stopped with
high school or earlier.6 In this narrative, everyone who can go to college should make
the rational choice to do so because of the tangible benefits—the money earned—
*
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1
Or at least correlates with.
2
See WALTER MCMAHON, HIGHER LEARNING, GREATER GOOD: THE PRIVATE AND
SCOIAL BENEFITS OF HIGHER EDUCATION 73–76 (2009).
3
See id. at 133–38.
4
See id. at 238.
5
See id. at 217–20.
6
See, e.g., David Leonhardt, Is College Worth It? Clearly, New Data Say, N.Y. TIMES:
THE UPSHOT (May 27, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/27/upshot/is-collegeworth-it-clearly-new-data-say.html [https://perma.cc/82L9-8DF6] (observing that the “pay
gap between college graduates and everyone else reached a record high” in 2013).

885

886

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 4

that education will confer individually on each student. The young dreamer who
wisely perseveres to an undergraduate degree will be rewarded.
As the price of higher education has risen, forcing students and their families
to stretch ever further to cover the costs, the importance of the anticipated, tangible
reward has grown. Thus, in this narrative, education requires an investment—in the
form of money—that yields a quantifiable return of the same nature. To speak of an
investment in higher education implicates ideas and perceptions of other
investments, particularly commercial investments in such tangible commodities as
housing or securities. In these putatively analogous contexts, the investor can
finance the purchase in various ways, including by use of debt, and the more creative
the financing or the more debt taken on, the higher the purchase price the investor
can afford. Of course, the more an investor borrows to pay for the purchase, the
greater the upside risk and the greater the downside risk. If the anticipated return
materializes, the investor earns that return on a larger initial outlay. But if it does not
materialize, then the investor still owes the lender the amount borrowed. So, there
are clear risks in investing.7 But to what extent is paying for college like buying a
house, shares in a corporate enterprise, or a bond? To what extent should it be viewed
in this way? How else could education be viewed? What words reflect these
alternative conceptions of the complicated experience that is college or university
learning?
Other terms, even the neutral sounding terms used to implement federal policy
in this context, also carry additional meanings. Consider student debt, an obligation
taken on by the student to the lender, typically the federal government. The student
borrower must repay the obligation and must do so in kind: the lender provides
money and demands compensation that is similarly fungible. These are clear and
unambiguous terms of commerce. Yet the provision of funding to students could
easily be characterized as an investment in turn, by the nation, in the future of the
individual student and the community to which the student belongs.8 The benefitting
student might then have an obligation to repay that larger community but not
necessarily in the form of cash. If this sounds like an extreme, idealistic, and
unrealistic conception of federal policy, consider that the Public Service Loan

7

For a discussion of the risk reward analysis of debt finance of higher education, see
Jonathan D. Glater, Student Debt and Higher Education Risk, 103 CAL. L. REV. 1561, 1580–
81 (2015).
8
This is one component of the rationale behind state initiatives to make higher
education more accessible for residents. See, e.g., Press Release, Governor Andrew M.
Cuomo, Governor Cuomo Launches the New York State Excelsior Scholarship Application
(June 7, 2017), https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-launches-new-yorkstate-excelsior-scholarship-application [https://perma.cc/YPQ9-TQPS] (“[T]his program is
the ticket to greater opportunity and will help build the stronger, smarter workforce New
York needs to compete in the global economy.”).
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Forgiveness program does exactly this—forgiving debt when students pursue
careers that, as the title suggests, serve the public.9
A similar analysis of the term forgiveness yields further insights. Forgiveness
is an act of grace; it is not necessary that the forgiven have done something to earn
a reprieve. Thus, there is tension between the implication of debt and the implication
of forgiveness because in the loan forgiveness program, elimination of further
repayment obligation is indeed earned. It is not the result of an act of legislative
grace. Students counting on forgiveness have sued the federal Department of
Education in the wake of changes in the availability of the program, arguing that
they were promised the cancellation of debt conditional on their public service and
that they honored their side of the bargain.10
The primary criticism mounted in this Article is not that too many students
pursue education for the wrong reasons, seeking lucre rather than learning. This is
certainly a compelling criticism and the consequences of a purely mercantile
conception of education’s value are clear and concerning.11 Education can and
should be more than a means to an end, and that is one lesson learned in the course
of a good education. But this Article’s argument is narrower and more modest. It is
that discussion of the policies that shape higher-education access in this country
typically, uncritically, and unselfconsciously employs and relies on particular
rhetoric that incorporates particular narratives, and those narratives in turn rely on
assumptions that merit careful scrutiny. Perhaps there is national consensus that the
values that underlie common assumptions are the right drivers of education policy.
But if the assumptions go unrecognized, the values never see the light of day, and
their desirability goes unassessed. This Article analyzes three examples of the
rhetoric used around student debt to expose narratives and to question the
assumptions.
The words used to describe higher-education finance matter. Because barriers
to higher-education access do not clearly run afoul of the mandates of the federal

9
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., If You Are Employed by a Government Office or Not-For-Profit
Organization You May Be Able to Receive Loan Forgivenss Under the Pulbic Service Loan
Forgiveness Program, FEDERAL STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/repayloans/forgiveness-cancellation/public-service [https://perma.cc/Q4FS-5EB2] (last visited
Mar. 29, 2018).
10
See Complaint, A.B.A. v. King, No. 16-cv-02476 (D.D.C Dec. 20, 2016),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/images/abanews/PSLF_filing_122016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RG38-S3H9].
11
See, e.g., SAMUEL E. ABRAMS, EDUCATION AND THE COMMERCIAL MINDSET 303
(2016) (concluding that “[m]uch of our mistaken thinking about education policy derives
from our commercial mindset.”). The critique of a purely mercantile perception of the value
of higher education is one made elsewhere, too. See Jonathan D. Glater, The Unsupportable
Cost of Variable Pricing of Student Loans, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2137, 2168 (2013)
(arguing that education “differs fundamentally from other investments”).
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Constitution12 or those of the various states, steps to make higher education more
available to the ever more diverse population of potential college students depends
on the legislative process. The legislative process, in turn, is a function of politics.
And politics reflects, as well as shapes, the terms of discourse around higher
education. To the extent that lawmakers accept unquestioningly that higher
education is a private good that benefits only the student, they are unlikely to
conclude that there is a need for greater governmental intervention to make college
more available. Lawmakers may instead contend that the government already does
too much in this regard. The deeper goal of this Article in identifying the
implications of the narratives and rhetoric of student debt is to encourage
identification and adoption of terms and frames that make greater accessibility a
higher national priority.
This Article complements a prior article that developed a critique of the spread
of a perspective on student borrowing that valued higher education in commercial
terms, as a commodity that yields benefits to the student.13 In this view, in facilitating
the low-cost debt financing of higher education, lawmakers aim to enable students
to obtain more lucrative employment and achieve upward socioeconomic mobility.14
The provision of loans thus has failed to the extent that students do not seek and/or
do not obtain sufficiently high paying jobs.15 While that prior article analyzed and
criticized the unthinking adoption of a neoliberal perspective—which the legislative
history does not clearly show lawmakers held or intended to implement—it did not
extend to consider the implications of the words typically used in discussions of
student debt, or the implications and connotations of those words.16 This Article
contends that the choices by scholars, regulators, and lawmakers when they speak
about student debt shape and limit the field of possible reforms.
The discussion that follows will analyze three examples of choices of words
used to describe aspects of higher education finance: (1) the concept of the student
borrower; (2) the oft-raised question of whether college is worth it; and (3) the claim
that federal loan repayment assistance policies for indebted graduates who enter
public service unfairly favor certain career choices. The conclusion briefly returns
to the context in which these narratives are used in discussions of student debt in
12

For example, the Supreme Court has rejected the argument that the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment encompasses disparate treatment of students on the
basis of socioeconomic status. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,
28 (1973) (finding that unequal funding of public education did “not operate to the peculiar
disadvantage of any suspect class.”).
13
See Jonathan D. Glater, Law and the Conundrum of Higher Education Quality, 51
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1211 (2018).
14
See id. at 1231–33 (analyzing language in Ass’n of Private Sector Colls. & Univs. v.
Duncan, 640 F. App’x 5, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2016), ascribing to Congress this motive for providing
federal student loans).
15
See id. at 1233 (questioning the claim that “Congress would not have provided aid in
the form of loans at all unless lawmakers had intended that borrowers earn enough money to
repay their obligations”).
16
See id. at 1247–54.
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particular, and higher education finance more generally, to illustrate that
assumptions and perceptions underlying the narratives take on more importance as
questions of equity come to depend more on legislative rather than judicial action.
I. THE BORROWER
How policymakers conceive of the student loan borrower is critical to
understanding the degree of sympathy shown for the indebted. From a policy
perspective, the failure to graduate by a student who receives a grant, who does not
have to repay the funds expended to put college within reach, may be a failure. But
it is not a failure that results in additional consequences or expressions of contempt
for the student recipient, even though that recipient of the grant benefitted from
public (or institutional) largesse. The student borrower, on the other hand, still
carries an obligation to repay the loan incurred, regardless of education and/or
employment outcome, and failure to honor that obligation will draw criticism. This
reflects the concrete nature of the financial obligation incurred. Perhaps the
difference in treatment helps to explain policy choices to treat education debt
exceptionally under the federal Bankruptcy Code.17 The Code permits discharge of
education debt only if the borrower can demonstrate in an adversarial proceeding
that the repayment would constitute “undue hardship.”18
History helps to understand this difference. Rafael I. Pardo and Michelle R.
Lacey include in their empirical assessment of the availability of discharge some of
the details; they conclude that “fear of abuse by student loan debtors led to the
addition of the undue hardship test.”19 This would be less of a concern were it the
case that student borrowers were engaging in fraud on the government by obtaining
student loans to pay for higher education, avoiding the obligation to repay through
bankruptcy proceedings, and then reaping the benefits of that education in the form
of career opportunities and higher incomes. But there was little to no evidence of

17
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2012) limits eligibility for discharge of student debt in
bankruptcy proceedings to instances in which the student can show that the repayment
obligation imposes an “undue hardship” on the indebted student. Scholars who have
investigated the availability of discharge through bankruptcy have found that it is not
necessarily and always unavailable, but that the path is not straight and that factors affecting
the outcome for the borrower often include circumstances that should not bear on the result.
See Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, The Real Student-Loan Scandal: Undue Hardship
Discharge Litigation, 83 AM. BANKR. L. J. 179, 229–32 (2009) (finding that “nondoctrinal
case characteristics, which have no legal relevance and thus ought not to have any bearing
on the amount of debt discharged, do influence the substantive outcome of undue hardship
discharge litigation”).
18
Pardo & Lacey, supra note 17, at 191.
19
Ryan Freeman, Student-Loan Discharge—An Empirical Study of the Undue
Hardship Provision of § 523(a)(8) Under Appellate Review, 30 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 147,
154 (2013).

890

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 4

such strategic behavior.20 One study of the frequency of discharge of student debt
found a rate lower than one percent.21
From a rhetorical perspective, fear of exploitation and manipulation of a
government lending program may have been inevitable. Legislators have directed
little attention to the risk that recipients of grants may commit fraud by
underreporting of income, for example, or the risk that students and families may
strategically impoverish themselves in order to obtain more federal support.22 But
these polices were never framed as debt has been; debt is different because of the
obligation to repay. When Congress created the guaranteed federal student loan
program in the mid-1960s, even though credit did not constitute the primary
intervention to make higher education more accessible, 23 lawmakers had to address
the kind of undesirable conduct that occurs with commercial credit products. That
was the model of financing that they had adopted, after all.
The very concept of debt has a moral component because, as an expression of
trust by the lender, it should be repaid. The failure to repay is reprehensible—good
people repay their debts and bad people do not.24 Sometimes the failure to repay may
be explicable, even justified, but that is not the default perspective. And when the
debt is extended in an expression of public, civic generosity, perhaps the evasion of
the obligation is that much more appropriately subject to criticism. The failure to
repay may be forgiven, but forgiveness, again, constitutes kindness on the part of
the lender, who has discretion over whether to demand repayment.
In a commercial transaction, a bank loan for purchase of a product, there is little
reason for a borrower to anticipate forgiveness. The lender engages in the transaction
with the expectation of return of funds, plus any interest and fees. Lenders naturally
have an interest in making it difficult for a borrower to eliminate the repayment
obligation. When this provision of commercial credit is adopted as the model for
financing of higher education, both real and perceived incentives are imported, too.
The lender, even if it is the federal government rather than a private, for profit lender,
may act to restrict borrower conduct. This is so because the borrower, in the eyes of
the lender, may have an incentive to engage in strategic behavior to avoid repayment.

20

See John A. E. Pottow, The Nondischargeability of Student Loans in Personal
Bankruptcy Proceedings: The Search for a Theory, 44 CANADIAN BUS. L. J. 245, 248–49
(2007).
21
See id. at 249 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at pp. 139–47; reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6100–08).
22
There are federal programs that arguably encourage this kind of strategic behavior.
See, e.g., Timothy L. Takacs & David L. McGuffey, Medicaid Planning: Can It Be Justified?
Legal and Ethical Implications of Medicaid Planning, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 111, 127
(2002) (noting the incentive to self impoverish in order to qualify for Medicaid and
describing statutory framework attempting to limit strategic behavior).
23
Glater, supra note 7, at 1575 n.67 and accompanying text (describing emphasis in
the Higher Education Act of 1965 on grant aid rather than provision of loans).
24
DAVID GRAEBER, DEBT: THE FIRST 5,000 YEARS 4 (2011).

2018]

NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC OF STUDENT DEBT

891

In business, avoidance of obligations through fraud or bankruptcy (or both) can be
a viable business tactic.
Yet in the absence of evidence of strategic behavior, acting to forestall it
imposes its own costs. In the context of student lending, this may take the form of
the demanding “undue hardship” standard of the Bankruptcy Code. The availability
of credit to student borrowers itself constitutes an intervention to make loans
available on terms that they otherwise would not be, as will be discussed in more
detail below.25 It is consequently less than obvious that the commercial loan is or
should be considered analogous to the education loan. This is not to argue that
students should be allowed to discharge their loan obligations haphazardly, but that,
at a minimum, exceptionally restrictive treatment of the loans demands
justification.26 The goal of extending the loans is to promote access, not repayment.
II. IS COLLEGE WORTH IT?27
Steadily rising tuition has prompted a flurry of public soul searching in recent
years over the value of college. Often this takes a form of the question: Is college
worth it? William Bennett, former secretary of education in the first Bush
Administration, has suggested that at least sometimes, the answer is no.28 The
argument is straightforward and intuitive: when college costs upward of $60,000 per
year at a private, nonprofit institution, and public colleges do not lag by all that
much, the pressure to earn a high salary justifying the expense is clear. If education
is an investment like any other, the higher the price, the higher the return necessary
to justify the initial outlay.
As a factual matter, the evidence is rather convincing that on average, and for
most people, a college degree is among the best investments available to achieve a
higher income and a healthier, longer, and happier life.29 This is, of course, accepting
the investment paradigm. Higher education is also one of the best pursuits available
for the informing and honing of the mind, regardless of the pecuniary benefits with
which a degree is associated. It is clear that, again for most people, forgoing higher
education correlates with a lower, and declining, income.30 One reason the case for

25

See infra Part 3.
And such justification is lacking in the legislative record. See supra note 12 and
accompanying text.
27
See generally WILLIAM J. BENNETT & DAVID WILEZOL, IS COLLEGE WORTH IT? A
FORMER UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF EDUCATION AND A LIBERAL ARTS GRADUATE
EXPOSE THE BROKEN PROMISE OF HIGHER EDUCATION (2013) (examining the costs and
rewards of a modern college education).
28
Id. at XI–XV (noting that there are “many factors that make a college education worth
the price—or not.”).
29
See, e.g., Leonhardt, supra note 6 (concluding that “[f]or all the struggles that many
young college graduates face, a four-year degree has probably never been more valuable”).
30
See id.
26
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higher education is so compelling is the widening gap between incomes of those
with college degrees and those without, because the latter group is earning less.31
The evidence supporting greater permeation of higher education throughout the
population does not mean that for every potential college student, higher education
is a good idea, or that the experience will yield the desired outcome for each student.
Myriad variables can hinder student success, from family health or financial crises
to a lack of self-discipline, self-confidence, social capital, or adequate primary and
secondary school preparation. For some fraction of students, enrolling in and
borrowing to pay for college will be a terrible idea. But predicting perfectly for
whom it is a bad idea is likely impossible and, even if it were achievable, would
invite an exercise of excessive paternalism. For reasons spelled out in the next few
paragraphs, it is better to err on the side of sending more people to college and then
helping those who experience an adverse outcome, than allowing the high apparent
price to discourage people from attempting to matriculate at all.
The idea that, for some students, college is not “worth it,” is fraught. Some
number of students, especially those who disproportionately attend the most elite
institutions,32 will always find college worth it because the likelihood of a poor
outcome, in terms of post-college employment and compensation, is relatively low.33
These students whose families are in the top of the income distribution are well
positioned to take on the risk associated with any investment, including one in a
college degree. Put another way, to claim that college is not worth it must invite the
question: For whom? And to argue, without more,34 that for some students college
is not worth it, is really to argue that fewer poor students, who are less likely to be
able to weather an adverse outcome, should pursue higher education. After all, the
downside is worse for them.
Failure to take into account the distributive effects of an argument that college
is not worth the cost is to ignore the resulting cost to society. Some students who
could have attended, graduated, benefitted, and produced benefits for the larger
community, will not go. There is already clear evidence that students who could

31
See, e.g., Jennifer Ma et al., Education Pays 2016: The Benefits of Higher Education
for Individuals and Society, THE COLLEGE BOARD
23 (Fig. 2.6),
https://trends.collegeboard.org/sites/default/files/education-pays-2016-full-report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9EEG-9TNC] (showing differences in earnings by education level and over
time).
32
David Leonhardt, America’s Great Working-Class Colleges, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/18/opinion/sunday/americas-great-workingclass-colleges.html [https://perma.cc/XZJ&-54HP].
33
Caroline Hoxby & Christopher Avery, The Missing “One-Offs”: The Hidden Supply
of High-Achieving, Low Income Students, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 1, 2
(2013).
34
That is, to argue that for some it is not worth it, without identifying for whom, is to
suggest that the financial status of a student is a relevant and acceptable, valid determinant
of higher education opportunity.
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succeed at the most elite institutions do not even apply.35 Putting the question
differently, when college is “worth it,” beneficiaries include many beyond the
student. College graduates make the lives of others better, too. Economists have
found empirical evidence of greater civic engagement by college graduates,36 and
political theorists have long asserted that an informed citizenry benefits
democracy.37
The calculation of the wisdom of a single student’s effort to graduate should
include much beyond the income earned by that student, should that student be
successful. And foreclosing or discouraging higher education for particular students
for whom college is deemed not worthwhile has effects beyond that student too. The
opportunity costs and benefits should be considered and nearly always, when the
question of college’s value is raised, they are ignored. The choice of words, the
exclusion of consideration of context and implication, permits such imprecise
perceptions to survive and spread.
III. UNFAIR FAVOR
In its 2018 budget, the Trump Administration (the “Administration”) proposed
that Public Service Loan Forgiveness (“PSLF”) be abolished. The Administration
criticized the program, which allows indebted students who pursue careers in public
service to eliminate the balance of their student loan obligations after ten years of
repayment, because it “unfairly favors some career choices over others and is
complicated for borrowers to navigate.”38 The language of unfair favor has multiple
implications, two of which are addressed here and both of which rely on assumptions
that lack historical basis or normative justification. First, implicit in the
characterization is the acceptance of a particular notion of what is fair, and second,
that notion historically has been and currently should be controversial.
First, creation of PSLF was justified to address the perceived undervaluation
and corresponding under-compensation of those who choose to work in public
service.39 Compensation of teachers, firefighters and other first responders, for
35
See, e.g., Hoxby & Avery, supra note 33; see also Ma et al., supra note 31, at 9
(summarizing scholarship finding that “[n]umerous economic analyses indicate that students
who, because of their demographic characteristics and academic experiences, hesitate to go
to college may benefit the most from a postsecondary degree”).
36
MCMAHON, supra note 2, at 206–09.
37
See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson, Preamble to a Bill for the More General Diffusion of
Knowledge, in 2 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 526–27 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950).
38
WHITE HOUSE, MAJOR SAVINGS AND REFORMS: BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT
FISCAL YEAR 2018 129 (2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb
/budget/fy2018/msar.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q4BZ-EWCZ].
39
See, e.g., 153 CONG. REC. E1538 (daily ed., July 17, 2007) (statement of Rep. Betty
McCollum) (the PSLF program “recognizes that the salaries for some of the most important
jobs in our communities—teachers, first responders, early childhood educators, law
enforcement officers and others—do not always match the value of their work”). The
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example, was not regarded as reflective of the value people in those careers
provide.40 The program aims to encourage students to consider and enter these
careers despite the wages paid.41 This choice of goals has its own implications, the
most important of which may be that the market wages for people who pursue these
careers are lower than they ought to be. The market is not the sole arbiter of value,
and the market assessments of value may not reflect the value that society assigns.
Thus, when the Trump Administration characterizes PSLF as unfairly favoring those
who choose particular careers, the Administration valorizes the market’s valuation
above any competing value judgment. This would be a fine conclusion to reach,
were it recognized and discussed explicitly; left implicit and undiscussed, the
Administration’s assertion lacks normative justification. The case for or against
allowing the market to decide the value of particular career choices should be made
in the open, explicitly.
The Administration’s view of PSLF is ahistorical, in that the program was
created precisely because of legislative unhappiness with the number of students
pursuing public service careers given the difficult financial consequences faced by
those students who did choose those paths.42 They perceived that the market
punished these choices with lower wages and PSLF was designed as a
countermeasure. 43 Indeed, it was unhappiness with market outcomes overall that led
to the creation of federal student aid programs that were the precursors to the system
we have today: federally guaranteed student loans were a policy response to the
extremely high interest rates that students had to pay in order to borrow from banks,
which were understandably cautious in extending credit to borrowers with no
collateral other than their scholarly promise.44 Again, lawmakers sought to counter
the market’s disfavor, not to introduce favoritism. As in so many areas, specification
of a justifiable baseline, comparison to which might suggest the proper policy
response, is missing.
Second, in addition to prizing the market’s determination of the value of
different careers, the Administration’s proposal does not recognize any special value
of public service. The choice to serve the public is, in the view of the Administration,
observation that PSLF is too complicated raises a host of additional questions, such as who
benefits and who suffers from complexity, but those are beyond the scope of this Article.
Such concerns do not relate to choice of words.
40
Id.
41
34 C.F.R. § 685.219(a) (2018) (“The Public Service Loan Forgiveness Program is
intended to encourage individuals to enter and continue in full-time public service
employment by forgiving the remaining balance of their Direct [student] loans after they
satisfy the public service and loan payment requirements of this section.”).
42
See, e.g., 153 CONG. REC. E1380 (daily ed., June 21, 2007) (statement of Rep. John
P. Sarbanes) (commenting that the “rising cost of higher education has led to greater and
greater student debt that in turn has become an impediment for many young people who
would otherwise choose a career in service”).
43
See, e.g., 153 CONG. REC. H7497 (daily ed., July 11, 2007) (statement of Rep. Sutton)
(arguing that expanded loan forgiveness “recognizes the value of our public servants”).
44
Glater, supra note 7, at 1564 n.10 and accompanying text.
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no different from choosing to serve any private employer. Perhaps in this view, some
students choose lower paying, publicly interested jobs because of the satisfaction
they derive from doing so; there is no need to encourage more people to consider
those jobs. If not enough do, then presumably labor markets will adjust and wages
will rise, drawing more people to pursue those careers. That is a conventional
narrative. However, there is nothing in that story that makes the conclusion of labor
markets and their determination of which careers to “favor” with higher wages,
intrinsically “fair.”
At a deeper level, the dismissal of the possibility that public service careers are
particularly valuable to society and particularly subject to undervaluation by labor
markets rejects a conception of higher education as bestowing benefits that are
public and shared, rather than private and exclusive. The Trump Administration’s
criticism suggests that the relevant criterion in choosing a career is individual
compensation and not potential social benefit. There is a symmetry here in the
perspective of the Budget Proposal and Secretary Bennett’s criticism of the value of
a college education: both focus on only a single, narrow set of benefits of education
and exclude consideration of broader benefits. No justification of omission of other
variables is offered. If other benefits of higher education were taken into account, it
is quite possible that significantly greater federal policy interventions to promote
access, graduation, and public service careers would be called for. Indeed, at least
one economist who attempted to measure the communal benefits of higher education
reached precisely this conclusion.45
CONCLUSION
The words used in the discussion of student debt can limit discussions of
potential reforms aimed at promoting accessibility of higher education. The words
constrain ambitions of policy. Words reflect assumptions and narratives that shape
scholarly debate and, more importantly, political debate—for it is within the realm
of politics that serious possibility of reform lies. Failure to think critically about the
words used in policy discussions hinders recognition of limits on the policy
imagination that may upon examination prove arbitrary and illusory. This Article
has sought to provoke consideration of the implications of the words used in talking
about higher education in order to enable richer conversations that will lead to higher
ambitions, new possibilities, and greater opportunity.46

45

MCMAHON, supra note 2, at 254–55 (warning that the benefits of higher education
are “seriously understated”).
46
See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 2, sc. 2 (“[F]or there is nothing / either
good or bad, but thinking makes it so: to me / it is a prison.”).

